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RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW IRRATIONALLY APPLIED:
THE LEGALIZATION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BY THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS IN
GOODRIDGE V DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Thomas Ryan Lanet
I. INTRODUCTION

In its 2003 decision, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,' the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disregarded a core tenet of the
western legal tradition by subverting the rule of law to achieve its desired social
end.2 In Goodridge, the majority purportedly applied a rational basis test in
holding that prohibitions against same-sex marriage violate the Massachusetts
Constitution.3 The Massachusetts Constitution provides: "In the government of
this commonwealth,... the judicial [branch] shall never exercise the legislative
and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of
laws and not of men. 4 This case is a concerning instance of a court distorting
the rule of law by replacing it with the rule of man in order to satisfy the
justices' personal or political perspectives. 5
In the western legal tradition, the rule of law has served as the foundation for
the development of the common law. 6 Implicit in the rule of law is the
requirement that courts apply a standard of review appropriate to the
circumstances. Justices act capriciously in their rulings when they disregard the
applicable standard of review in order to achieve a conclusion that is consistent
with their own personal or political viewpoints. 7
This Note argues that courts must maintain their commitment to the rule of
law by applying the correct standard of review even when their own personal or
political views move them to do otherwise. It develops this argument in four
steps. The Note first discusses the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.8 Second, it
addresses what the applicable standard of review should be in cases addressing
t
Liberty
1.
2.
3.

Editor-in-Chief,Liberty UniversityLaw Review, 2006-07; J.D. Candidate, May2007,
University School of Law; B.A. in Mathematics, 2004, Dordt College.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
See discussion infra Parts II, IV.
4. MASS. CONST. art. XXX (emphasis added).
5. See discussion infra Part V.
6.

HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL

TRADITION 9-10 (1983).
7. See discussion infra Parts I, III, IV.
8. See discussion infra Part II.
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alleged discrimination based on sexual orientation. 9 Third, it analyzes the
standard of review that the majority in Goodridge actually applied while
purportedly applying a "rational basis" test.' 0 Finally, this Note discusses the
overall impact of the Goodridge decision and the repercussions of distorting the
rule of law."

II. GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
In March and April of 2001, several same-sex couples attempted to obtain a
marriage license from a city or town clerk's office.' 2 Each of the couples
completed the requisite health forms and the required "notice of intention to
marry" forms.13 "In each case, the city clerk either refused to accept the notice
of intention to marry or denied a marriage license to the couple on the ground
that Massachusetts does not recognize same-sex marriage."' 4
On April 11, 2001, seven same-sex couples from five Massachusetts
counties filed a single complaint in the Superior Court against the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health ("Department"). In their
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they "and other qualified same-sex
couples" were denied equal "access to marriage licenses, and the legal and
social status of civil marriage, as well as the protections, benefits and
obligations of marriage.' 5 The plaintiffs alleged that the Department's policy,
and practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated their
rights under articles I, VI, VII, X, XII, and XVI of the Massachusetts
Constitution. 16
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
13. Id. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 19 (West 1998).
14. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 950.
15. Id.
16. Id. MASS. CONST. art. I provides:

All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and
unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because
of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.
MASS. CONST. art. VI provides: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any
other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the
community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public .... "
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On May 7, 2002, the Superior Court Department, Suffolk County,
dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the marriage statutes should be construed to
permit marriage between persons of the same sex, holding that the only
reasonable construction of chapter 207 of the General Laws of Massachusetts
precludes such an interpretation.' 7 The court further held that "the marriage
exclusion does not offend the liberty, freedom, equality, or due process
provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, and that the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights does not guarantee 'the fundamental right to marry a
person of the same sex."",18 The court reasoned that "prohibiting same-sex
marriage rationally furthers the Legislature's legitimate interest in safeguarding
the 'primary purpose' of marriage, [which is] 'procreation." ' 19 The court
dismissed the complaint and entered summary judgment for the Department.
The couples appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
granted plaintiffs direct appellate review.2 °
The plaintiffs first argued that the Supreme Judicial Court could interpret the
statute to permit same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses because nothing
in the statute itself specifically prohibits marriage between persons of the same
sex. Thus, the couples argued, the court could afford same-sex couples the

MASS. CONST. art. VII provides:

Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety,
prosperity, and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honor, or
private interest of any one man, family or class of men: Therefore the
people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to
institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when
their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.
MAss. CONST. art. X provides, in relevant part: "Each individual of the society has a right to
be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing
laws .....

MASS. CONST. art. XII provides, in relevant part: "[N]o subject shall be... deprived of his
property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law.., or deprived of his
life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
MASS. CONST. art. XVI provides, in relevant part: "The right of free speech shall not be
abridged."
17. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 951.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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same opportunity to obtain a marriage license as opposite-sex couples without
ever having to decide whether the statute is constitutional. 2'
In addressing the plaintiffs' first argument, the court indicated that it was
attempting to "carry out the Legislature's intent" by determining the words of
22
the statute "according to 'the ordinary and approved usage of the language.'
Accordingly,
the court applied an "everyday meaning" in interpreting the term
"marriage., 23 In relying upon the common law definition of marriage, the court
declared that marriage is the "legal union of a man and a woman as husband
and wife." 24 Thus, the court reasoned that since the interpretation of marriage
should be construed according to the common law understanding of marriage,
the only reasonable explanation for the statute's silence is that the legislature
did not25intend that same-sex couples should be allowed to obtain a license to
marry.
In writing the majority opinion for the court, Chief Justice Marshall claimed
that the right to marry, without the right to choose one's partner, signifies little
in the form of an actual right.26 Further, one's right to express sexual intimacy,
and one's right to establish a family are among some of the "most basic of
every individual's liberty and due process rights. 27 Notwithstanding its
declaration of those rights, the court properly recognized that even the right to
marry is subject to "appropriate government restrictions in the interests of
public health, safety, and welfare."2"
The court next addressed the plaintiffs' second contention, namely that
denying same-sex couples the opportunity to marry violated the Massachusetts
Constitution.29 The court framed plaintiffs' claim not merely as the right to
marry, but "the right to choose to marry." 30 Thus, as the court reasoned, if one
does not have the right to choose whom he or she may marry, then one is
denied the full protection of the laws. 31 In bolstering this alleged right to
21. Id. at 952.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. However, in Part IV of the court's opinion, the majority abandons the common law
definition of marriage in favor of a more "stable" definition of marriage. That is, the court
adopted a definition of marriage that is more tolerant "in light of evolving constitutional
standards." See id. at 969.
25. Id. at 953.
26. Id. at 958.
27. Id. at 959.
28. Id. at 958.
29. Id. at 953.
30. Id. at 957 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
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choose one's spouse, the court analogized
to antiquated laws that prohibited
32
blacks.
and
whites
between
marriage
The plaintiffs attacked the statute on substantive due process and equal
protection grounds. The Department argued that no fundamental liberty
interest or suspect class was at stake, contending that the rational basis test
should be the proper standard of review. The Department then articulated three
reasons why the legislature had a rational basis for enacting the statute. First,
the Department argued that prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying
provided a "favorable setting for procreation." Second, the Department
reasoned that by restricting marriage to only opposite-sex couples, the
legislature was "ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing," namely, a "twoparent family with one parent of each sex." Finally, the Department claimed
that by limiting marriage to only opposite-sex couples, the statute "preserv[ed]
scarce state and private financial resources." 33 The court addressed each ofthe
Department's justifications.
The court rejected the Department's first legislative rationale.34 According
to the court, the primary purpose of marriage is not procreation. 35 As the court
noted, the marriage statute in question does not contain any requirement that
32. Id. at 958. The court analogized from a United States Supreme Court case which held
that a statutory bar to interracial marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a ban on interracial
marriage violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
However, in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a ban on same-sex marriages did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In so doing,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Loving required the issuance ofmarriage licenses
to same-sex couples. The court stated that Loving was decided "solely on the grounds of the
patent racial discrimination" of such statutes. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187. The court in Baker
went on to state that "in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction
between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental
difference in sex." Id.
The couple then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed the
plaintiffs' appeal without opinion "for want of a substantial federal question." Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). Unlike a denial of certiorari, such a dismissal represents a decision on the
merits by the Supreme Court that the constitutional challenge presented by the plaintiffs is not
valid, a decision which is binding on lower courts. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344
(1975). Thus, the Supreme Court, five years after it decided Loving, determined that denying
same-sex couples the right to marry does not raise the same federal constitutional issues as
denial based upon race.
33. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
34. Id. at 962.
35. Id. at 961. The judge in the Superior Court accepted the Department's first rationale,
reasoning that "the state's interest in regulating the marriage is based on the traditional concept
that marriage's primary purpose is procreation." Id.
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the marriage applicants demonstrate their ability or intention to conceive
children.36 The court declared that the foundation of marriage was not the
"begetting of children," but rather the "exclusive and permanent commitment
of the marriage partners to one another., 37 Consequently, the court determined
that prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying in order to provide a favorable
setting for procreation was not a legitimate governmental purpose.3"
In turning to the Department's second stated rationale, the court admitted
39
that "[p]rotecting the welfare of children is a paramount State policy.
However, the court rejected the assertion that by restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples, the legislature was attempting to further the well-being of
children. 40 As the court suggested, in our modem society, the traditional
American family is only a distant echo, and today's family structure is anything
but traditional. 4' Further, the court pronounced that in considering the best
interests of a child, a parent's sexual orientation or marital status is not an
important factor to consider.42 In the eyes of the court, no rational basis exists
for penalizing children by "depriving them of State benefits because the State
disapproves of their parents' sexual orientation." 43 Thus, the court determined
that there is "no rational relationship between the marriage statute"
and the
' 44
legislature's goal of "protecting the 'optimal' child rearing unit.

36. Id.
37. Id. at 961.
38. Id. at 962.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 963.
42. Id. In order to support its claim, the court made no attempt to justify such an assertion
through well-articulated judicial reasoning. The court composedly assumes that a parent's
sexual orientation is not a real factor to be considered, given our modem strides in the realm of
tolerance towards alternative lifestyles. In fact, the court did not even set forth an argument to
justify its asserted conclusion, nor did it attempt to manipulate empirical data to achieve its end.
Rather, the court lackadaisically cited a few loosely connected cases that deal with child
custody issues. See Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Mass. 1983) (holding that a parent's
sexual orientation is an insufficient ground to deny custody of a child in a divorce action).
However, Doe simply stands for the proposition that a parent's sexual orientation should not be
the sole reason for denying custody of a child to an otherwise fit parent. It is a significant leap
to assert that a parent's sexual orientation should receive little consideration when
contemplating the child's best interest.
43. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964.
44. Id. at 963. At this juncture, the court essentially discards the legislature's ideal of the
optimal child-rearing unit in favor of a judicial ideal of what is an optimal child-rearing unit,
namely a same-sex couple environment in addition to the traditional opposite-sex environment.
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The court wholly rejected the third rationale advanced by the Department. A
ban on same-sex marriage, the court believed, sustains "no rational relationship
to the goal of economy." 45 The Department argued that same-sex couples are
"less financially dependent on each other than opposite-sex couples."
However, the court determined that a demonstration of financial dependence
upon one's spouse is not a prerequisite for receiving financial benefits under
Massachusetts marriage laws. 6
The Department also argued in the alternative that by expanding marriage to
47
include same-sex couples, Massachusetts will be creating interstate conflict.

The court, however, held that such a consideration should not preclude
Massachusetts from affording its citizens the full protection guaranteed under
the Massachusetts Constitution. 48 As the court stated, "each State is free to
address difficult issues of individual liberty in the manner its own Constitution
demands," subject only to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 9
The court concluded by considering the plaintiffs' requested relief. The
plaintiffs sought only a declaration that the exclusion of same-sex couples from
access to civil marriage violates Massachusetts law.50 In light of plaintiffs'
requested relief and its desire to preserve as much of the statute as possible, the
court chose to redefine marriage. 51 The court redefined marriage to mean the
"voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others. 52
The court looked to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the highest court of the
45. Id. at 964.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 967. The argument that expanding marriage to include same-sex couples will
lead to interstate conflict is, unfortunately, grounded in reality. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, No. 2654 04 4 (Va. Ct. App. filed Nov. 10, 2004). In Miller, a same-sex couple,
both of whom were citizens of Virginia, went to Vermont for the purposes of entering into a
civil union and then returned to Virginia, which does not recognize same-sex marriages or civil
unions. Subsequently, the couple became pregnant through artificial insemination. Eventually
the couple split, and they filed proceedings in Vermont for the dissolution of their civil union.
Thereafter, pursuant to the civil union, Vermont granted parentage rights over the child to each
partner. However, the partner that gave birth to the child remained in Virginia. Since Virginia
does not recognize civil unions, it also does not recognize parentage rights created pursuant to
civil unions. Thus, because of Vermont's granting of civil unions, the Vermont and Virginia
state courts rendered conflicting rulings-Vermont ordered a visitation right that Virginia does
not recognize.
48. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 969.
51. Id
52. Id
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province of Ontario, to provide
persuasive authority in redefining the common53
law meaning of marriage.
The court declared that barring same-sex couples from the protections,
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage violated the Massachusetts
Constitution. 4 Consequently, the court vacated the summary judgment entered
by the trial court in favor of the Department."
III. HOMOSEXUALITY AND RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW

Courts apply three generally accepted standards of review when determining
the constitutionality of legislation under an equal protection challenge. In
determining the applicable standard of review, courts look at the classifications
the statute makes and the rights the statute implicates. 56 After settling on the
appropriate standard of review, courts then analyze the legislative purpose of
the statute. Courts also consider the connection between the legislative purpose
and the classification made under the given statute. The appropriate level of
scrutiny that is applied to this connection depends upon which standard of
review is being applied. 7
The highest standard of review employed by courts is the "strict scrutiny"
test.58

Statutes that command strict scrutiny seldom survive the stringent

requirements that are the hallmarks of this test.59 In order to survive a challenge
53. Id. The court borrowed from Halpern v. Toronto (City), 172 O.A.C. 276 (2003), a
Canadian case that addressed a similar problem to that which confronted the Goodridgecourt.
The Goodridgecourt chose to rely upon foreign law to justify its "reforming" of the common
law, clearly the role of the legislature, rather than referencing authority from the various states
that have refused to redefine the common law definition of marriage. See, e.g., Standhardt v.
Super. Ct, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding marriage statutes rationally related to a
State's legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and child rearing within marriage); Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) ("[E]qual protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the state's classification of persons
authorized to marry."); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("There can
be no doubt that there exists a rational basis for the state to limit the definition of marriage to
exclude same-sex relationships.").
54. Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 969.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
57. Id.at 272 ("[I]n assessing an equal protection challenge, a court is called upon only to
measure the basic validity of the legislative classification..").
58. See id.at 272 ("[R]acial classification[s], regardless of purported motivation, [are]
presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.").
59. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (North Carolina residents brought action
against various state officials challenging North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan as
racially motivated in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
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under the strict scrutiny test, the legislature must demonstrate that it has a
"compelling governmental interest" for enacting the statute. 60 For example,
times of war and national security have furnished compelling
governmental
61
interests that satisfied the requirements of strict scrutiny.
If the government manages to demonstrate a compelling governmental
interest, the court will then examine the connection between the classification
and the legislative purpose. 62 This classification must be "narrowly tailored" to
further the compelling governmental interest. The classification must
be
63
interest.
governmental
the
to
related
rationally
merely
necessary-not
Generally, a statute will elicit strict scrutiny review only if the statute
infringes upon a fundamental right or creates a suspect classification. 64 The
Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg defined a "fundamental right" as
"only those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition., 65 Statutes that have historically
incurred strict scrutiny are those that create suspect classifications.66 Generally,
suspect classifications are classifications that are based on race or national
67
origin.
have classifications
uniformly condemned
statutes
that 68disadvantage racial
minoritiesCourts
by making
based solely
on race.

60. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that
government may treat people differently because of their race only for the most compelling
reasons).
61. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,217 (1944) (a highly controversial
case which held that national security constitutes a "pressing public necessity," though the
government's use of race to advance such an objective must be narrowly tailored).
62. See Hamm v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (1964) (holding that a
state may, for statistical purposes, require designation of parties' race on divorce decrees).
63. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (invalidating a Florida
criminal statute prohibiting interracial cohabitation).
64. See Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 988 (1977) ("Where there is no
infringement of fundamental rights or any suspect class, a statutory discrimination will be
upheld if it is "rationally related to a legitimate State interest.").
65. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
66. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (invalidating a state law requiring
that a candidate's race be designated on the election ballot).
67. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (West Virginiajury selection
statute that discriminated on the basis of race held unconstitutional).
68. However, statutes that make race specific classifications that benefit racial minorities
have been upheld in limited circumstances. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (holding that race may be one of a number of factors considered by a
school in passing on applications), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that a
state university law school's race-conscious admissions policy was sufficiently narrowly-tailored
to constitutionally meet the state's compelling interest in a diverse student body), with City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (holding that the city failed to
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The second standard of review is the "heightened scrutiny" or "intermediate
scrutiny" test. It lies "between [the] extremes of a rational basis review and
strict scrutiny" and "generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications
based on sex or illegitimacy." 69 In order to survive a challenge under the
heightened scrutiny test, the state must show an "important governmental
interest" in enacting the statute and creating the given classification. If the
government manages to demonstrate an important governmental interest, the
court will then examine the connection between the classification and the
legislative purpose. This classification must be "substantially related" to the
achievement of the governmental interest. 70
The third standard of review is the "rational basis" test.7 1 The rational basis
test is employed in all other cases where the statute does not merit strict scrutiny
or heightened scrutiny assessment. Given that strict scrutiny and heightened
scrutiny tests only apply in limited contexts, courts most often exercise rational
basis review. 72
In order to survive a challenge under the rational basis test, a court need only
find that the legislature had a "legitimate governmental purpose" for enacting
the statute and creating the given classification. 73 Typically under rational-basis
review, the statute is given a strong presumption of validity and the burden of
74
proving the statute unconstitutional rests solely with the party challenging it.
Generally, any reasonably conceivable purpose for enacting the statute will
suffice for the purposes of rational basis review. Furthermore, it is irrelevant

demonstrate a compelling governmental interest justifying its "Minority Business Enterprises"
plan and that the plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy effects of prior discrimination).
69. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
70. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (holding that the statute,
making it more difficult for a child born abroad and out of wedlock to claim citizenship through
that parent if the citizen parent was the father, did not violate the equal protection guarantee of
the Fifth Amendment).
71. See, e.g., N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding a rule
denying employment compensation to persons receiving methadone treatment).
72. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 291 (1984).
73. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) ("[T]he relationship between
gender and traffic safety becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed's requirement that the genderbased difference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective.").
74. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 709 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (1999)
(quoting Aloha Freightways, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 701 N.E.2d 961 (1998)). See also
Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 988 (1977) ("A party challenging the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment bears the burden of proving that the proper standard
of review is not satisfied.... In order to prevail.., a challenger must affirmatively show that
no factual situation can be conceived that will support the reasonableness of the enactment.").
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for constitutional analysis whether a reason now advanced in support of a
statutory classification is one that actually motivated the legislature.75
If the court determines that there is a legitimate governmental purpose for the
statute, it will then examine the connection between the classification and the
legislative purpose. 76 The classification must bear a "rational relation to some
legitimate end."77
The rational basis test should properly apply to marriage statutes that make
classifications based upon sexual preference.78 Because marriage statutes, like
the one at issue in Goodridge,do not concern a suspect classification such as
race, strict scrutiny would only apply if homosexual marriage is a fundamental
right. 79 However, to demonstrate that homosexual marriage is a fundamental
right, one would have to show that homosexual marriage is "objectively, deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 80 Thus, a statute limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples should never merit strict scrutiny review. 8'

75. See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). In Beach Communications,
respondents claimed that there was no rational basis for the exemption in the Communications
Policy Act of 1984. The Court emphatically rejected this challenge and stated that "because we
never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant
for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually
motivated the legislature." Id. at 315.
76. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (holding that New York's prohibition on
assisting suicide does not violate Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
77. Id. at 799.
78. See Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (Fed. Cir.), cert.denied, 494
U.S. 1003 (1990) (holding that an admittedly homosexual naval reserve officer was not a
member of a class to which heightened scrutiny had to be afforded or for which the Navy needed
compelling interests to justify discrimination). See also Hrynda v. U.S., 933 F. Supp. 1047,
1051-53 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Rutgers Council ofAAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, The State Univ., 689
A.2d 828, 835 (App. Div. 1997) (both holding that classifications based on sexual preferences
are ordinarily not suspect for equal protection purposes).
79. See Selland v. Perry, 905 F.Supp. 260,265-66 (D. Md. 1995) (holding that the Navy's
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy as applied to a homosexual naval officer does not infringe a
fundamental right or create a suspect classification, thus applying a rational basis test); Town of
Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a statutory
classification based on a choice of sexual partners is not a "suspect classification," and is thus
subject to less than a "strict scrutiny" equal protection analysis).
80. See supra note 65.
81. The majority in Goodridge framed the plaintiffs' assertion not merely as the right to
marry, but the right to choose to marry. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, even if the alleged right is couched in terms of "the right to choose to marry"
rather than the right of homosexual marriage, one's right to choose one's spouse is not a
fundamental right as defined by Glucksberg. That is, the right to choose one's spouse is not so
rooted in our nation's history and tradition as to warrant strict scrutiny review.
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Likewise, statutes that limit marriage to opposite sex couples should not
receive heightened scrutiny.82 Heightened scrutiny is generally reserved for
gender-based classifications.8 3 However, marriage statutes that preclude
marriage by same-sex couples are based on sexual preference, not gender.8 4 In
addition, marriage statutes that restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples do not
discriminate based on gender because males and females are treated equally.
Therefore, because neither the strict scrutiny test nor the heightened scrutiny
test is applicable in the realm of marriage statutes, courts-as Massachusetts
purported to do-should apply a rational basis test in determining the
constitutionality of such statutes. Accordingly, in order to survive a
constitutional challenge, the court would only have to determine that at least
one reasonably conceivable purpose exists for enacting the marriage statute and
that this purpose is logically connected to the wording of the statute.85
Depending upon the wording of the statute, marriage statutes should generally
survive constitutional claims, given that rational basis is the lowest standard of
review.

IV.

GOODRIDGE'S TWISTED RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD

The court in Goodridge purported to apply the rational basis test 8 6 to the
Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriage.87 In application, however, the court
used a much more stringent test. The court rejected all three asserted legislative
purposes posited by the Department. 8 In fact, the court stated that the rational
basis test under a substantive due process challenge "requires that statutes
'bear[ ] a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
some other phase of the general welfare.' 8 9 As for an equal protection
challenge, the rational basis test "requires that 'an impartial lawmaker could
logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose
90
that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class."'

82. See supra note 78.
83. See supranote 73.
84. See supra note 79.
85.

See supranotes 76-77.

86. See Dickerson v. Att'y Gen., 488 N.E.2d 757, 759 (1985) ("For the purpose of equal
protection analysis, our standard ofreview.., is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution."). See also Commonwealth v. Franklin Fruit Co., 446 N.E.2d 63,
67 (1983).
87. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 960.
Id.
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However, after stating the applicable tests, the court never applied or revisited
these statements.
The court considered each of the Department's rationales for the legislative
prohibition on same-sex marriage. 9' However, rather than examining whether
any of these alleged state interests were legitimate or reasonable, the court
looked at whether the alleged purposes were a "necessarycomponent of civil
marriage." g This subtle difference turns the rational basis test upon its head.93
The shift in focus from legitimate or reasonable to necessaryplaces a laborious
burden on the state; it turns the rational basis test into something more akin to a
strict scrutiny test. The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the
classification be narrowly tailored but also that it be the least restrictive means
possible. That is, under the strict scrutiny test, the classification must be
necessary with no other alternatives. 94 Further, this shift in focus requires the
government to demonstrate that the legislative end is necessary.9 5 However,
litiganthas the burden of proving
under traditional rational basis review, the
96
legitimate.
not
is
end
legislative
that the
Generally, under rational basis review, courts give deference to the judgment
of the legislature.97 States are also not required to convince the courts of the
correctness of their legislative judgments. 98 Generally, if there was evidence
before the legislature that reasonably supported the classification in the statute,
litigants cannot procure invalidation of the legislation by introducing evidence
in court that the legislature was infact mistaken. 99 However, the Goodridge
court rejected the evidence that had been presented to the Massachusetts
legislature, evidence that indicated that "alternate family structures have not yet
been conclusively shown to be the equivalent of the marital family structure
that has established itself as a successful one over a period of centuries."' 0 0

91.

Id. at 961-64.

92. Id. at 962 (emphasis added).
93. See Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 988 (1977) ("[T]he burden is an
onerous one; a reviewing court will presume a statute's validity, and make all rational inferences
in favor of it.") (emphasis added).
94. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (holding statute "will be upheld
only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy").
95.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962.

96. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 709 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (1999)
("[Tlhe burden of proving the measure invalid rests with the party challenging it.").
97. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).
98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Goodridge court commenced a legislative commission from its
judicial bench.
Although the court recognized that "[p]rotecting the welfare of children is a
paramount State policy," the court again ignored the boundaries under the
rational basis test. 101 In order to satisfy the rational basis test, the court need
only find a conceivable, legitimate purpose for denying same-sex couples
marriage. 0 2 The Massachusetts legislature had already determined that
opposite-sex couples were the optimal setting for raising children, and that
based on the health, safety, and wellbeing of children raised in an opposite-sex
environment, such an environment has proven to be a stable and optimal way to
raise children. 0 3 The legislature had also observed that children raised in
same-sex environments have not withstood the test of time to determine the
efficacy and stability of such an environment for the children raised therein.'0 4
These reasons of the legislature are legitimate purposes involving the health,
safety, and wellbeing of children in Massachusetts.
The legislature's legitimate purpose is also rationally connected to the
classification of same-sex versus opposite-sex couples. Thus, the government
satisfied the rational basis test. Consequently, under a properly administered
rational basis test, the court should have upheld Massachusetts' ban on samesex marriage. 105
V. IMPLICATIONS OF DEPARTING FROM THE RULE OF LAW

The Goodridgecourt compels both legal scholars and lay persons to confront
the reality of the court's decision. 0 6 Abandoning the rule of law eventually
leads to the replacement of well-settled legal principles with the current and
temporary social view of the prevailing private interest group. 10 7 Abandoning
101. Id. at 962.
102. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 464.
103. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1004 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
106. Since the Supreme Judicial Court ofMassachusetts published its 2003 decision, at least
one court has unequivocally disagreed with the majority's rationale. See Hernandez v. Robles,
26 A.D.3d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Three courts have declined to follow Goodridge. See
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). At least
one court has distinguished the Goodridgemajority's rationale. See In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123,
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
107. See McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a shifting
Supreme Court majority is the absolutely indispensable requirement that judicial opinions be
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the rule of law ultimately leads to no law at all. Once courts are free to forsake
the underlying principles upon which our Western legal tradition has
developed, law may develop into an unfortunate power struggle.10 8 However, if
the legal community adheres to the rule of law and the fundamental principles
upon which ourjurisprudence has developed, then the American people will be
assured impartiality, consistency, and the justice our nation so desires.
By twisting the proper standard of review, the majority in the Goodridge
decision effectively replaced the legislature's judgment and factual findings
with their own assessment of what the status of marriage should be in
Massachusetts. Under the mask of "evolving constitutional standards," the
court completely redefined marriage, a task that is undoubtedly suited only for
the Massachusetts legislature. °9 The court, however, ignored these
jurisdictional boundaries l0 by redefining marriage to include same-sex
couples 11
Historically, under the rational basis test, which the Goodridge court
purportedly employed, courts give due deference to the findings of the
legislature.11 2 The Goodridgecourt, however, ignored this important principle.
In fact, the court paradoxically stated that its new marriage definition "leaves
intact the Legislature's broad discretion to regulate marriage."' 13 However, the
impact of the court's decision accomplishes the complete opposite. The court
has not left the Massachusetts legislature with "broad discretion to regulate
marriage." The court has in fact replaced broad legislative discretion with that
of its own broad judicial discretion. Rather than the court giving due deference
to the legislature's decision to confine marriage to opposite-sex couples, the
legislature must now give due deference to the court's decision to expand
marriage to same-sex couples! 14 Such a result contradicts our republican form
grounded in consistently applied principle. That iswhat prevents judges from ruling... as their
personal preferences dictate.")
108. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
Vintage 1968).
109. Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 969.
110. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("The calculus of
effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a
judicial responsibility.").
111. Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 969.
112. See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
113. Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 969.
114. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). In light of
the Goodridgedecision, the Massachusetts legislature requested an opinion from the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts concerning the constitutionality of a bill which prohibited
same-sex couples from entering into marriage, but allows them to form civil unions with all the
benefits, protections, rights, and responsibilities of marriage. The court held as a matter of first
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of government and is an immediate repercussion of abandoning the proper
standard of review.' When courts are confronted with legal issues that tend to
be emotionally charged, such as homosexual marriage or abortion, it is
imperative that courts maintain a commitment to the rule of law by applying the
proper standard of review.116
A clear illustration of a case where a court properly adhered to the rule of
law by applying the applicable standard of review is Morrison v. Sadler."7 In
Morrison, three same-sex couples filed suit to compel county clerks in the state
of Indiana to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples."18 Unlike the
Goodridge court, the Morrison court held that the limitation of marriage to
opposite-sex was not a violation of the Indiana Constitution." 9 In reaching its
20
conclusion, the court in Morrison correctly applied the rational basis test.
Three purposes were offered in support of the legislative classification.' 2 ' As to
the adequacy of these purposes, the Morrison court properly deferred to the
discretion of the legislature.122 In addressing the classification made under the
statute in question--opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples-the court
again deferred to the discretion of the legislature in making such a
classification. 23 Consequently, the Morrison court reached only the first
justification for the legislative classification, which was to promote procreation
by the natural parents. 24 In so finding, the court determined that the

impression that the bill violated the equal protection and due process requirements of the
Massachusetts Constitution. Id.at 572. See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 207A, §§ 2-3
(West 2003).
115. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,751 (1999) ("The asserted authority would blur...
the separate duties of the judicial and political branches of the state governments, displacing
state decisions that 'go to the heart of representative government."' (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991))).
116.

See supra note 108.

117. Morrison v.Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind.Ct. App. 2005).
118. Id.at 19.
119. Id.at35.

120. Id.at 22 ("[S]tatutes will survive ... scrutiny if they pass the most basic rational
relationship test.").
121. Id. at 23 ("The Plaintiffs assert that there are three possible, but ultimately
unreasonable, reasons for the legislative classification: to promote procreation and child-rearing
by both natural parents, to promote the traditional family unit, and to promote the integrity of
traditional marriage.").
122. Id. at 21 ("[C]ourts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion.").
123. Id. at 22.
124. Id.at 23.
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classification of same-sex couples versus25opposite-sex couples was rationally
related to the state's legitimate purpose. 1
VI. CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
violated a core tenet of law in the Western legal tradition by distorting the rule
of law to achieve its desired social end. This Note further argued that courts
must commit themselves to the rule of law. Implicit in this commitment is the
requirement that courts apply the proper standard of review even when the
result is contrary to their personal or political view. The temptation to subvert
the rule of law goes well beyond the narrow confines of same-sex marriage
issues. The invitation to replace the rule of law with the rule of man is an
ongoing snare for courts. Therefore, courts must maintain their commitment to
the rule of law in order to sustain our American system of law and government.

125. Id. at 25 ("[T]herefore, the legislative classification of extending marriage benefits to
opposite-sex couples but not same-sex couples is reasonably related to a clearly identifiable,
inherent characteristic that distinguishes the two classes: the ability or inability to procreate by
,natural' means.").
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